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Reconciliation and the Constitution: 
A Transcript of the Roundtable 
Amar Bhatia, Beverley Jacobs, Jonathan Rudin,  
Douglas Sanderson, and Mark Walters* 
As described in the opening piece in this Volume of the Supreme Court 
Law Review, unprecedented national media and political attention was 
given to the relationship between Indigenous people and the Canadian 
state in 2016. As part of our conference, we asked a group of people to 
come together and talk about the future of the Constitution as a means or 
an obstacle to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and First Nations in 
Canada. Amnesty International’s most recent global report on the State of 
the World’s Human Rights praised Canada’s action regarding refugees, but 
then noted that “[c]oncerns persisted about the failure to uphold the rights 
of Indigenous Peoples in the face of economic development projects”.1  
We asked our panelists about the connection between the rhetoric of 
reconciliation and the situation on the ground. Would the Court continue to 
play a significant role in the development of section 35 Aboriginal rights? 
Are these discussions likely to play out in courts, at constitutional 
amendment conferences, or in the political arena? 
Generously contributing their thoughts and knowledge were, in 
alphabetical order, Amar Bhatia, who joined Osgoode’s full-time faculty 
on July 1, 2014 after serving as a Catalyst Fellow and Visiting Professor 
at Osgoode for the 2013-14 academic year. He articled and worked in 
union-side labour and employment law in Toronto before returning to 
graduate school, and his current work looks at issues of status and 
authority of migrant workers and Indigenous peoples under Canadian 
immigration law, Aboriginal law, treaty relations, and Indigenous legal 
traditions; Beverley Jacobs, now appointed to the University of Windsor 
                                                                                                                       
* Amar Bhatia, Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School; Beverley Jacobs, Assistant 
Professor, University of Windsor Faculty of Law; Jonathan Rudin, Program Director, Aboriginal Legal 
Services in Toronto; Douglas Sanderson, Associate Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law; 
and Mark Walters, F.R. Scott Professor of Public and Constitutional Law, McGill University. 
1 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of the World’s 
Human Rights, 22 February 2017, available at: <https://perma.cc/U6PY-RVNZ>.  
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Faculty of Law. She lives and practices law at her home community of 
Six Nations of the Grand River Territory in Southern Ontario. For the 
past 20 or so years, much of her work has focussed on anti-violence work 
including advocacy for families of missing and murdered Indigenous 
women and girls and educating the public about the history and impacts 
of colonization, which has resulted in the historic traumas that are 
occurring to Indigenous peoples; Jonathan Rudin, hired in 1990 to 
Aboriginal Legal Services and has been with ALS ever since, now as 
Program Director. He co-wrote the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples’ report on Justice – Bridging the Cultural Divide – and was a 
member of the Research Advisory Committee of the Ipperwash Inquiry; 
Douglas Sanderson, on Faculty at the University of Toronto Faculty of 
Law, was managing editor of the inaugural edition of the Indigenous Law 
Journal in 2002 while a student. He went on to get his LL.M from 
Columbia University. Professor Sanderson is a member of the Opaskwayak 
Cree Nation, and he has been deeply engaged in Aboriginal issues from a 
policy perspective. Professor Sanderson’s research areas include Aboriginal 
and legal theory, as well as private law (primarily property law) and 
public and private legal theory. His work uses the lens of material culture 
and property theory to examine the nature of historic injustice to 
Indigenous peoples and possible avenues for redress. Moving beyond the 
framework of common law property rights and constitutional land/treaty 
rights, his scholarship focuses on Aboriginal institutions, post-colonial 
reconciliation, and rebuilding community; and finally, Mark Walters, 
F.R. Scott Professor of Public and Constitutional Law at McGill 
University since 2016. He has been a full time legal academic since his 
appointment to the Faculty of Law at Queen’s in 1999 and he researches 
and publishes in the areas of public and constitutional law, legal history, 
and legal theory, with a special emphasis on the rights of Indigenous 
peoples, institutional structures, and the history of legal ideas. In 
addition, Osgoode Hall Law Dean Lorne Sossin contributed his 
considerable talents as moderator. 
We did not ask Panellists to submit papers for this Roundtable, but the 
issue is so critical, and the contributions so thoughtful, that we were 
determined to ensure the widest possible dissemination. What follows is a 
text produced from a transcript of the event. We sent each speaker the 
transcript of their portion and invited them to edit for clarity, and to 
provide references that might assist the reader who wants to learn more, 
before reassembling the whole for publication. Our hope is that what 
follows will help to inspire, provoke, and inform our ongoing 
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conversations about the practical and political meaning of “reconciliation” 
— and its relationship to our constitutional order. 
Benjamin Berger & Sonia Lawrence, Editors of this Volume 
Lorne Sossin: ….. [A]s we bring this conference to its 
conclusion, to its crescendo, by giving time to the 
really remarkable group assembled for this last 
panel on the vexing and compelling issues around 
reconciliation. We’ve already heard a bit about 
that in the panel on Daniels, for those who were a 
part of that discussion, and of course the theme of 
Reconciliation circles around so many issues of 
importance to those gathered here today. 
To join me in what will be a more conversational 
[and] interactive panel on the topic, we’ve 
assembled people from different perspectives and 
life experiences, but all who are wrestling with 
the common issues of where Reconciliation 
comes from, what it means, where it is going, and 
if it will take us where we need to go.  
…. 
Beverley Jacobs: I am going to introduce myself in my language first. 
<Introduction in Cayuga>. What I said to you was 
“Greetings of Peace to You” in Cayuga language, 
which is one of the Six Nations which forms the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy. I am Bear Clan from 
the Mohawk Nation, which is another one of the 
Six Nations. I practice law part-time and I live at 
the Six Nations Grand River Territory. I grew up in 
my community all my life and lived there until  
I went to law school. I want to share some 
experiences and I am going to try and be as quick as 
possible because I do not want to steal the stage 
from my co-panelists. But what I want to talk about 
is this issue about reconciliation; but it is more than 
reconciliation. It is about truth — the truth about the 
history of this place called Canada. Coming from 
Haudenosaunee culture and my upbringing, I was 
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raised very…politically, I guess you would say — 
raised very traditionally and spiritually within my 
longhouse tradition, and raised with chiefs and 
clanmothers and faithkeepers from the time I was 
born. And so, my experiences come from that.  
In talking about the truth about this place called 
Canada: the history of Canada does not exist 
from 1867. It does not exist from the creation of 
the British North America Act 1867. In fact, the 
history of it goes way back. When we discuss the 
history of legislation and law or colonial laws and 
when we start talking about that history, our 
original history comes as a result of truth and 
reconciliation. Our relationship was about having 
peace with early colonizers—one of them was the 
British—and with the British, there was an early 
treaty relationship called the Silver Covenant 
Chain. It was our Haudenosaunee Leadership and 
the Colonial Leadership that came to this 
relationship, and it was about the land, and our 
relationship to the land and how we would share 
this land.  
There were basic principles of this treaty 
relationship, and I always use these principles to 
also understand healthy relationships. There are 
very basic principles of a healthy relationship: 
friendship, peace, and respect. That was the 
original relationship that we were supposed to 
have. The British used an “Iron Chain” that 
represented this relationship and it was later 
changed to silver because they thought iron 
would rust. They wanted to make sure those links 
would not rust and fall apart. Then it was 
established later in the years as a Wampum Belt, 
the Covenant Chain.  
All of that was built into this. [Bev raises and 
points to the Two-Row Wampum Belt]. I just 
want a show of hands to tell me if you know what 
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this is? Oh good, there are a lot. I am happy about 
that, because this represents Truth and 
Reconciliation: this is what we must return to. 
And this is what was based on those original 
principles of peace, trust, respect, and friendship. 
I won’t explain the Covenant Chain, because that 
would require an additional 10 minutes, but the 
history of this Belt is about sovereignty. 
Haudenosaunee peoples have had a sovereign 
identity since colonization and our Leadership 
and our Confederacy have been very consistent in 
that message since colonisation. So, this vessel 
(on the belt) is a colonizer ship. Our Confederacy 
Leadership created this relationship first with the 
Dutch, then with the French, then with the 
British, and then with the United States. It was 
based on a Nation-to-Nation relationship, and 
that we would continue on this river of life not 
interfering with each other’s ways based on those 
basic principles.  
 
Figure 1: Two Row Wampum belt (Reproduction) Photograph by Nativemedia 
(Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)]. 
With respect to the BNA 1867 and s 91(24) and 
its establishment: it was unilateral, it was 
colonial, and it reflected genocidal policies, and 
its creation was to annihilate us as a people. It 
was about controlling “Indians” and “lands 
reserved for Indians”. That is what was 
established under the BNA 1867, now called the  
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Constitution. All of the sudden we became wards 
of the Crown, where the Federal Government had 
control of us as “Indian People,” and controlled 
our lands and we became forced into their ship 
(on the wampum, belt). What has happened is 
that as a Confederacy, the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy that still exists today… it is now a 
very thin line (on the wampum belt) compared to 
this (the line signifying the colonizer’s ship on 
the Belt) because we were never able to practice 
our own sovereignty and develop our own 
institutions that were part of that.  
Who gave Britain the authority to do this? They 
violated the Two Row Wampum relationship 
immediately. And when you are violating a 
relationship, it is called violence. And so we have 
been in a violent relationship since colonization 
to this day: it has not ended, we are still in it. 
Because now we are forced into these legal 
institutions, and trying to define what that means 
within this colonial legal process and institution. 
So, part of this is understanding that: that is what 
I call truth. The truth of history. The truth of law. 
And if we are going to reconcile this relationship, 
that truth has to be understood, and it has to be 
respected.  
Until we get to that point, we are going to 
continue to hash out what this all means, and we, 
as Indigenous peoples, are going to suffer, as we 
have suffered, as a result of those colonial racist 
policies. So that is my “spiel.” That’s how I am 
going to start this. Because that is what this is 
about: it is about truth. It is more than just 
reconciliation. We must be honest about that and 
the relationship that we have. For me, as an 
Haudenosaunee person who has now been trained 
in this colonial legal system, and I have been 
trained [also] in my own canoe, about my own 
laws and customs and language. And I know 
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what has happened. So, this is based on my own 
experiences, and I can speak the truth about that. 
So thank you. Nia:wen (Thank you). 
Mark Walters: We were asked to consider the Chief Justice of 
Canada’s comment, that now is a constitutional 
moment of sorts where we need to figure out 
what it means to, as she put it, “reconcile 
interests of First Nations’ interests with Crown 
sovereignty”.  
Bev has just mentioned sovereignty, but I think 
Bev had a different kind of sovereignty in mind 
than Crown sovereignty. It’s important to note the 
formula that the Chief Justice used when making 
her suggestion concerning reconciliation. The 
formula, the passage that she’s paraphrasing, was 
first used in the Van der Peet2 case in 1996 as a 
way of explaining what the point of s 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 is: to reconcile the pre-
existence of Aboriginal peoples with Crown 
sovereignty. This has always sounded to me a bit 
like reconciliation as resignation. Aboriginal 
peoples need to be resigned to the fact that they 
live under Crown sovereignty. 
The Chief Justice has said other things about 
reconciliation at other times. In fact, in Van der 
Peet itself, she was in dissent, and she expressed 
reconciliation in an entirely different way: she 
said there must be a reconciliation of the diverse 
legal cultures of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
peoples,3 which strikes me as a much better way 
of putting the point.  
And, then, many years later, in the famous Haida 
Nation4 case, [at] paragraph 20, she says something 
very different again and much more in line with 
                                                                                                                       
2 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (S.C.C.). 
3 Id., at para. 232. 
4 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004]  
3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.). 
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what Bev has in mind. She says the treaty process 
must be one about reconciling “pre-existing 
Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown 
sovereignty”, that, in other words, “sovereignty 
claims” must be reconciled through “honourable 
negotiation”.5 Maybe that’s a more promising way 
to think about reconciliation than the way that she 
put it more recently, a way that, as mentioned, 
appears to have been drawn from the older Van der 
Peet case. 
I know I only have a few minutes to start things 
off. I think there’s a slide that I’ll just refer to 
quickly. Since Bev was mentioning the Covenant 
Chain series of treaties, I thought it would be 
helpful to put up [referring to PowerPoint] an 
image of the two Wampum Belts given at the 
Niagara Treaty of 1764, which was one of many 
council meetings where the Covenant Chain was 
affirmed.  
The imagery, I think, is quite remarkable. In both  
of [the] belts, the idea of linking arms or holding 
hands is emphasized, suggesting a conception  
of reconciliation and suggesting as well that 
reconciliation is hardly a new idea. It’s an ancient 
idea. My sense, although this is not something I’m 
qualified to speak about, is that reconciliation is 
deeply integral to Indigenous legal cultures. I think 
it’s also a concept that must be very deeply integral 
to the non-Indigenous conception of legality or the 
rule of law. Once we start thinking about the 
meeting of legal cultures, maybe reconciliation is 
the concept that allows the two cultures to come 
together in terms of their respective conceptions  
of law and legal relationships. So I’ll stop there  
for now. 
                                                                                                                       
5 Id., at para. 20. 
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Figure 2: Photograph of replica of The Covenant Chain Wampum presented by 
Sir William Johnson at the conclusion of the Council of Niagara. This replica 
was commissioned by Nathan Tidridge and created by Ken Maracle of the 
Seneca Nation. 
Lorne Sossin: Excellent. Thank you very much. Douglas, the 
question for you is, is this judicial creativity or 
are they making stuff up? 
Douglas Sanderson: They are totally making stuff up. Ni-ti-ki-ni-son, 
Amo Binashe, amisk ni dodem. My Cree name is 
Amo Binashe, it means hummingbird, and I’m 
from the Beaver Clan of the Opaskwayak Cree. 
Go fighting Cree! 
I want to begin by answering a question that I’m 
sure is on all your minds and the answer is yes, 
these chairs are a thousand times more comfortable. 
Literally, a thousand times. 
Mark Walters: It’s warm up here too! 
Douglas Sanderson: Yeah. So, the idea of reconciling First Nations’ 
interests with Crown sovereignty, I think highlights 
a contrast with what I think is the fundamental 
lesson that should have come out of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s Report. And I think 
the Report makes clear that the chief injustice — 
the stealing and abusing children is of course 
terrible and awful — but the primary problem was 
the belief that Indigenous cultures were less 
valuable than settler cultures. That mindset underlay 
the policy of the residential schools. 
What does it mean to believe that Indigenous 
cultures are as valuable as settler cultures? Well, 
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if we take that teaching seriously, then there are 
implications. One of the implications is that we 
have to look at the way Court continues to 
essentialize Indigenous people and Indigenous 
cultures. And we’re going to talk more about that 
in the next round. 
But the idea of sovereignty itself and the idea that 
the Crown is asserting sovereignty over 
Indigenous people is part of that essentialization 
of Indigenous people. McLachlin CJ says in 
Tsilhqot’in,6 the latest Aboriginal title case we 
have, that what the Crown is asserting is 
something she calls “radical title.”7 And when she 
says this, there’s no footnote about what radical 
title is. There is no commentary. There is no 
explanation. She just says that radical title is 
being asserted. 
I went looking to figure out what radical title is 
and it’s complicated but in Imperial history, what 
radical title is, is the right of a sovereign to assert 
sovereignty over a foreign territory. It does not 
give them the right to occupy the land but it gives 
them the right to create laws that give the land 
away. 
Strangely, occupation has been at the core of civil 
law since, at least, Roman times—two thousand 
years. And at least since medieval times in the 
common law tradition, occupation of land is 
possession of land, and possession is the root of 
title at common law. We forget that when 
Europeans beg[a]n the period of exploration in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century, it’s also the 
time that they begin developing concepts of 
international law. How is it that European nations 
are going to interact with one another when they 
                                                                                                                       
6 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, 2014 
SCC 44 (S.C.C.). 
7 Id., at paras. 12, 18, 69, 71. 
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encounter each other at the high seas and on 
distant lands? Occupation plays an essential role 
in the development of international law: it founds 
the foundational concepts of international law.  
But what happens is that European Powers decide 
that occupation is something that they get to 
assume and that Indigenous people don’t get to 
assume. And this is an idea that is not far off in 
our current day. If you remember back to the trial 
decision in Delgamuukw,8 there, McEachern 
CJSC felt that Indigenous peoples lived lives that 
were nasty and brutish and short; that they were 
too disorganized to have property rights… to 
have the ability to occupy their own lands and 
territories they’ve lived in for ten thousand years, 
because they weren’t civilized enough to have 
laws that would allow them to fully occupy their 
land in the way the Europeans were able to. 
And today’s Court continues a version of this 
legal fiction. We’re going to talk about that in the 
next round and how, I think, we can begin to 
address these legal fictions. Thanks. 
…. 
Jonathan Rudin: Thank you, Lorne. Thank you, Mark. So I’m 
going talk about reconciliation in a slightly 
different way. And I’m going to say that I’m 
troubled by the way we use reconciliation in law. 
And I think we use reconciliation and I think it 
can obscure reality. So if you think about the 
TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission], as 
Douglas said, we are talking about an event or a 
series of events that were done. So, for the 
residential school — there is a legacy from the 
residential school. The TRC makes a number of 
recommendations, wonderful recommendations, 
                                                                                                                       
8 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1991] B.C.J. No. 525, 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185, [1991] 3 
W.W.R. 97 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw (Trial)”].  
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that acknowledge the harm that was done by 
residential school and its legacy.9 
And in the context of an act or a series of acts 
like residential school, we can think “Well, what 
do we do to reconcile that?” But the difficulty 
with the term reconciliation, as I hear it, and I 
think, people understand it, is: We did something, 
we Canadian non-Indigenous society, we did 
something — it wasn’t good, it still has its 
impacts, we have to try and fix it. That’s 
“reconciliation”. But that misses a whole set of 
things that are going on now. And I’ll start with a 
look at three Supreme Court cases that were not 
Charter cases: Williams,10 Gladue,11 and 
Ipeelee.12 And those cases all say that Aboriginal 
people face, in the criminal justice system, direct 
and systemic discrimination. That direct and 
systemic discrimination doesn’t arise from a 
thing. That’s not a circumstance of residential 
school. That’s an attitude that is held and 
behaviors that are undertaken by people in power. 
If we talk about ... If we say “reconciliation”, that 
makes it sound like there was something that was 
done. It’s not something that was done, it is 
something that is — it is something that currently is 
happening. And when we talk about reconciliation 
as though we’re fixing something that happened, it 
makes it seem like something is not currently 
happening. It is currently happening.  
We see it all the time. It is playing out in 
Saskatchewan in the Colten Boushie case. 
                                                                                                                       
9 Truth and Reconciliation Canada. (2015). Honouring the truth, reconciling for the future: 
Summary of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. Winnipeg: 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. 
10 R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, 159 D.L.R. (4th) (S.C.C.). 
11 R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.). 
12 R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2012 SCC 13 (S.C.C.). 
(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) TRANSCRIPT OF THE ROUNDTABLE 285 
I’ve spent a lot of time in Thunder Bay and 
Indigenous kids—Indigenous people in Thunder 
Bay—get things thrown at them when they’re on 
the street, when they’re going to school. That is 
not a thing that was, that is a thing that exists, it 
has always existed independent of anything that 
Aboriginal people, Indigenous people ever did. 
It’s an attitude that needs to be confronted 
directly and sometimes, I think the term 
reconciliation obscures that reality and that’s 
what I’ll start with. Thank you. 
…. 
Amar Bhatia: Thank you. Thanks for also having me on the 
panel, where I feel highly unqualified, but here 
we go. 
I just wanted to talk about a couple ideas of 
reconciliation as someone who’s mostly 
interested in this topic from immigration law and 
refugee law [perspectives], and dealing with 
migrant worker issues as well. Also [as] someone 
who is a son of immigrants from India and the 
Philippines, I didn’t automatically think about 
some of these issues dealing with title and treaties 
when I was here at law school at Osgoode.  
Part of [what] my understanding about 
reconciliation has come to mean since then is 
going to Delgamuukw and the idea about 
reconciling with Crown sovereignty. Also there’s 
the phrase that was at the end there, talking about 
how we’re all here to stay13 and the idea that we 
are all stuck with each other. This resonated for 
me in the sense that for immigrant and migrant 
demands, there’s often a demand for permanent 
status, for secure status to be here to stay. But that 
                                                                                                                       
13 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 
D.L.R. (4th) 193 at para. 186 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. 
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kind of contrasts with these different ideas of 
reconciliation that are highly contested.  
Part of the idea of reconciliation is to have 
respect for relations. Coming out of the TRC, in 
some definitions outside of the Court is to work 
towards respectful relations, maybe even ones 
characterized by peace, friendship, respect and 
trust. And that’s a little bit different if you’re 
thinking about who is here to stay, in the context 
of what other folks were mentioning, which is 
these permanent structures of colonial law, of 
criminal law that people are living with. 
And there, I think there’s a different idea, it’s 
outside of law. The idea of settler colonialism, 
where it’s relating with all of these areas of law. It 
has to do with the taking of land, the removal of 
people from the land, and then the replacement of 
those people by other people. So, if you look at 
law within the structure of settler colonialism, 
then you can kind of measure, I think, the 
comments and rhetoric about reconciliation: that 
is, to say, what is it [the State] doing about the 
land that was taken, what is it doing about the 
people who are removed from that land, and what 
is it doing in the context of the replacement of 
those people on those lands. 
I guess there’s a lot more to say about that, but 
we’ve also talked about sovereignty. Just to keep 
in mind, maybe when I come back in the second 
round. There’s a few things you need for 
sovereignty in one definition of it, right? You 
have to have a defined territory, you have to have 
a permanent population, you have to have a 
government, and you have to have the capacity to 
enter into international relations. 
You can look at any of those things through the 
lens of Aboriginal law and Indigenous law and 
see how they play out. If you’re looking at it in 
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the context of defined territory, and the title 
decisions we’ve been talking about, either you 
would have title or you would have a treaty. 
Right? And that’s supposed to be how you work 
towards reconciliation. 
In terms of the permanent population, there’s been 
talk about giving control back over membership 
determination, and that’s where I’m interested in 
the immigration context. But it doesn’t go to the 
level of allowing First Nations, for instance, to 
adopt folks who don’t have Canadian citizenship 
or permanent resident status for that matter. So it 
sort of stays within the borders of the state 
sovereignty as to who can become a member, and  
I think that’s one of the measures of whether or not 
you’re having reconciliation that addresses settler 
colonialism. Because I don’t think it was the case 
before, that Indigenous nations were limited in 
who might be an immigrant in the context of who 
might be a member. That’s only something that the 
colonial state imposed that we continue through 
the Citizenship Act, the Immigration Act and the 
Indian Act. 
Lorne Sossin: Thanks, Amar. Thanks to all the panelists for 
getting started and I think where we are left as we 
move now to our second round of really where 
we can take the concept of Reconciliation — to 
what extent can it bring us to a better set of 
relationships, a better set of constitutional and 
societal outcomes? How can we come to terms 
with recognizing the problematic point of origin 
of Reconciliation in the colonial experience.  
At the moment, we don’t have a shared 
understanding of Reconciliation, or even what 
tense in which to speak of it: is reconciliation what 
we need to prepare for, or a process that is already 
underway? Is it something that is born of the very 
same presumptions and biases that animated the 
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colonial enterprise of asserting sovereignty or is it 
a process of reconciling sovereignty itself, peoples, 
communities, and individuals. Clearly the TRC 
process gives us a window into what is both going 
to be a personal and community, legal and social 
and interpersonal journey. 
So, because Reconciliation can mean all those 
things, some have recognized that is an ideal vessel 
through which, to express all the different layers of 
relationships with Indigenous peoples, legal and 
otherwise, that need to be mediated. It will mean 
many things to many people. And that’s why you’d 
be hard-pressed to find many people who disagree 
or oppose Reconciliation. What they disagree about 
is whether Reconciliation has any shared meaning, 
who should be doing the heavy lifting and where 
it’s going to take us. 
So, as we bring texture to where the concept of 
Reconciliation comes from (and not just the Chief 
Justice’s statement, but this discourse that so 
dominates Nation-to-Nation politics and our 
Constitutional s 35 and other legal interpretations), 
we come back to the question of where should it go. 
This question brings us to the second round of 
questions. We’ll stick to the same order. 
Bev Jacobs:  Okay. Thank you. So, in my impassioned 
introduction, I talked about being raised in my 
“canoe,” in the sense of understanding this 
relationship… because this is how I was raised, 
when I said I was raised politically. That’s how 
strong our people have been — to continue to 
understand this relationship, which was also 
based on peace. Our Constitution is called the 
Great Law of Peace. 
The Great Law of Peace enabled international 
law to occur because it brought together five, 
then later six, separate Nations. 
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And one of the principles of the Great Law of 
Peace was called the Tree of Peace. When it was 
planted, its roots were to spread, and anyone who 
was to find its roots and follow the source, they 
would be protected under the branches of the 
Great Law. And in our language, “onkwehonwe” 
means human being. It doesn’t mean that there’s 
a color. It means that we’re all human. Our laws 
are based on humanness and about human 
relationships and relationships with all the natural 
world. 
Our Constitution, the Great Law of Peace, is very 
complex and it includes everything. There’s no 
separation between spirituality or healthiness or 
ceremony or leadership. It all encompasses the 
same thing. And so when we establish those 
relations with other Nations, we thought that was 
going to be the same way with the colonizers.  
We have never forgotten or ever stopped 
believing that. It’s always been inherent in our 
relations to have peaceful relationships. And 
that’s what reconciliation is. 
So whose responsibility is it? It’s all of our 
responsibility. When it comes to educating about 
this history — about how Eurocentric Canadian law 
is trying to reconcile Indigenous peoples within the 
[one] ship. And that’s difficult to do because it also 
is very complex when people are not educated 
about our history and who we are as a People. And 
that’s frustrating, it’s very frustrating. I’ve been in 
politics, in colonial Canadian politics as a leader of 
the Native Women’s Association of Canada, and 
sitting at political tables and talks with 
parliamentarians on the other side. They gave me 
ten minutes to meet and to have a conversation 
about the real history but most do not have a clue 
about the Indian Act or about the impacts of 
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colonization and where the sources of these 
genocidal policies have come from. 
So that’s the frustration. And then there’s teaching. I 
have been teaching not only undergraduate level 
courses but in law school as well. In law school, 
students say “How come I didn’t learn this before? 
How come I’m just learning about this now?” And 
so that’s where the frustration and, hopefully, where 
this reconciliation comes into place in establishing 
peaceful relationships. That we’re all on the same 
intellect, that we’re all in the same way of thinking, 
because that’s what our teachings have always 
taught us: to have one mind. That’s what that meant. 
That we were all going to have one mind. We’re all 
going to come into this room and we’re all going to 
have that same intellect and reason to have peace.  
So, it didn’t just mean that we have peace as an 
individual and within our Nationhood, but rather 
that we think that you too have peace and that your 
Nationhood has peace. And so I wonder about that. 
I wonder about that understanding of what peace 
means and what peaceful relationships means. 
That’s where my response to the Chief Justice and 
the comment of [reconciling] First Nations interests 
with Crown sovereignty comes in. We’re not a 
special interest group. That’s been out of Canadian 
Law for a long time. We’re not a special interest 
group, and that’s what Canadians think. Canadians 
think that we’re a minority group with special 
interests. That’s not the truth.  
The truth is that our lands and our nationhood 
have been stolen away as a result of colonial law. 
And that law was used as a tool of assimilation 
and that law was based on colonial and genocidal 
policies. That’s the truth. So part of this whole 
process was coming to an understanding about 
these laws and policies. I had to come to peace 
with that as a Haudenosaunee person. And so, 
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how do we bring this relationship back? It’s like 
returning back to this healthy relationship of 
peace, trust and respect. Our teachings are very 
simple.  
There has to be a return to the teachings and 
principles of the Covenant Chain and the Two 
Row Wampum. It has to. It has to, because there 
are things happening in the natural world that we 
don’t have control of as human beings. And that’s 
what our teachings are about. Our teachings are 
about this humanness and how we need to have 
these relationships with each other; peaceful 
relationships, because we need to learn how to 
live on Mother Earth. That’s inevitable. So, it’s 
not just up to us as Indigenous peoples to 
reconcile with Canadian genocidal policies. 
We’re all descendants of this. Everyone has a 
responsibility to understand that.  
Thank you. 
Mark Walters: Thanks, Bev. I’m glad I get to follow you because 
you have given me lots of ideas about what to say. 
I’ll go back to the Haudenosaunee Great Tree of 
Peace, because of course there’s another tree in the 
room, I guess you could say, the “Living Tree” of 
the Constitution of Canada. Both the 
Haudenosaunee and Canadian Constitutions are 
trees.  
I like your tree better [Bev], actually. The Living 
Tree of the Canadian Constitution seems to be 
growing in one direction from a single root. The 
branches and foliage develop, but everything 
must be traced back to that single trunk and its 
root, and I have a suspicion that this image has 
something to do with the character of Crown 
sovereignty. 
In contrast, your tree has many roots, and the 
roots themselves are growing and spreading 
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outwards; so, in other words, the tree is growing 
in both directions at once. It’s a better image, 
because it’s less linear. There seems to be no 
beginning to the tree—no single sovereign point 
of origin. 
This leads me back to Crown sovereignty. The 
conception of reconciliation of Aboriginal 
peoples or interests with Crown sovereignty 
seems to imply quite a linear conception of law, 
something that is traced back to a root or 
originating phenomenon, namely, Crown 
sovereignty. However, perhaps part of the 
reconciliation process is for non-Indigenous 
people to rethink their bold conception of what 
law is. Perhaps it is time to contemplate the 
possibility of a more circular and less linear view 
of what law is, a more interpretive or dynamic 
view of what law is. But getting in the way of this 
reconception of law is the originating root for 
Canadian law, the Crown sovereign. Oddly 
enough, the term “Crown sovereignty” isn’t used 
very often elsewhere in our law. This is largely 
because the Crown isn’t really sovereign in 
Canada, and indeed in the British constitutional 
tradition the Crown hasn’t been sovereign since 
the 17th century at least. The conception of 
“Crown sovereignty” therefore seems to be sui 
generis, to borrow an expression; it is unique to 
Aboriginal law cases in Canada. 
In the Westminster tradition, Parliament may be 
sovereign or the Crown-in-Parliament may be 
sovereign. But in Canada we don’t even 
recognize that. We have a Constitution that limits 
the sovereignty of legislatures at both federal and 
provincial levels. I am not sure why this business 
of referring to “Crown sovereignty” in Aboriginal 
law cases developed. But I think we should get 
rid of it because it’s getting in the way of what 
we really mean; if you look closely at the cases, 
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when the courts refer to Crown sovereignty, what 
they are really referring to is the legislative 
sovereignty of either the provinces or of 
Parliament. However, legislative sovereignty in 
Canada is already constrained by so many 
constitutional rules and laws that to speak of 
sovereignty at all is, again, misleading. Stripped 
of the language of sovereignty and Crown, what 
is usually at stake in these cases is simply the 
ability of the legislature to act in the public 
interest subject to relevant constitutional laws and 
principles. 
To rephrase the statement from Van der Peet with 
these points in mind, then, what the Court is 
really saying is that we have to reconcile the fact 
that Aboriginal people have certain rights with 
the broader public interest. However, once we see 
the task in those terms, the rigidity of Crown 
sovereignty is replaced by a more supple notion. 
Sovereignty seems fixed and uncompromising. 
You can’t question sovereignty, can you? No, it 
will be said, because without its sovereign 
foundation our country will fall apart…the trunk 
of the Living Tree will be chopped down, or 
something like that. But if we are merely 
adjusting our sense of the public interest to 
accommodate Aboriginal rights, then the 
consequences are far less dramatic: the public 
interest is not fixed and unbending; it can and 
must make room for Canada’s Indigenous reality. 
So, the things that are being reconciled may be 
seen in a completely different light and, if so, 
then I would suggest that a different kind of 
balance altogether might be reached than one in 
which Crown sovereignty is on one side and 
weighs so heavily in the scales. Those are my 
thoughts for now. 
Lorne Sossin: That sounds great. 
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Mark Walters: For now. 
Douglas Sanderson: Alright. Thank you. When we finished in the last 
round, I was talking about Delgamuukw at the trial 
level,14 and I know you’re all thinking “well, oh, 
but it was appealed and it went all the way to the 
Supreme Court and then we got the Delgamuukw 
test for Aboriginal title.” But, I think the Court goes 
off the rails in Delgamuukw in some significant 
ways and I’m going to talk about the ways in 
which the Court makes things up. 
So the approach that the court lays out for itself is 
the sui generis approach, thank you, Mark. It is 
not like other things, they say, which gives the 
court a pretty free hand to shape Aboriginal law 
in any way that it really deems fit.  
One of the things that happened in Delgamuukw 
at the Supreme Court level is procedurally, Lamer 
CJ says, “Chief Justice McEachern , you did a 
really crappy job running the trial. You didn’t 
deal with the evidence problem… so we’re going 
to have a new trial.” And then he says, “Oh, but 
first let me lay out the test for Aboriginal title 
even though I don’t have any evidence before me, 
except the evidence that I just said was too 
crappy to run a trial.”  
So he lays out the test, and one of the parts of the 
test is this idea that Aboriginal title lands are held 
communally. And it’s another part of the 
judgment where there is no footnote. There’s no 
explanation. Lamer feels it in his gut that 
Aboriginal title is held communally because he’s 
seen like… Western movies, I guess, and read 
Louis L’Amour novels or something? Had he 
actually evaluated the evidence that was 
submitted by the anthropologists including Mills  
 
                                                                                                                       
14 Delgamuukw (Trial), supra, note 8. 
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and others, he would have learned that Gitskan 
and Witsuwet’in lands are held by Chiefs and 
Houses and they exercise authority, and we have 
ways of transferring those chiefly titles that come 
with distinct property interests. There was a reason 
why, when the Russians first encountered the 
Gitskan they called [them] “Men of Property.” 
So, [to] the idea that title lands are held 
communally, Lamer CJ then extends the idea that 
they are held inter-generationally, in fact. And 
this puts a very serious constraint on the use of 
Aboriginal title lands. Lamer CJ says …. Because 
the lands have to be held inter-generationally, it 
means that you cannot develop the land in a way 
that would destroy the First Nation’s attachment 
to the land. And the example given is that you 
cannot develop a parking lot on a hunting site. So 
if you can’t build a parking lot, why would you 
build a road? If you can’t build a road, what on 
earth could you possibly do in your territory? 
And this is all based on something that Lamer 
just made up. That he just felt strongly about. 
Because he has an idea of what Aboriginal people 
and Indigenous people are like. The Court 
essentializes Indigenous people and then uses that 
to limit rights and title. 
Lamer CJ actually goes further, right? So 
remember, the case is being thrown, [and] 
ordered for a new trial. He lays out the test and 
then he says, “Well, now I’m going to talk about 
justification of trenching Aboriginal title rights.” 
All of this is totally obiter, there’s no reason for 
us to be having this discussion. There’s no part in 
the Delgamuukw trial where the government is 
trying to justify its actions in some place.  
And so, what have we learned? Well, we’ve 
learned because First Nations people have to 
reconcile their title with the assertion of Crown 
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sovereignty, that means that Aboriginal title rights 
can be trenched by governments wanting to do 
things like build hydroelectric dams or engage in 
forestry or mining or the settlement of foreign 
populations. This is like the one place in our 
Constitution, the court just comes out and says,  
“I understand you have the Constitutional 
protective right, but the government has a policy. 
They want to settle some foreigners, so your 
Constitutionally protected right has to give way.” 
But I don’t think it has to be this way. First of all, 
I’m not going to deny that the Crown can act as a 
sovereign. We have a pretty nuanced sense of 
sovereignty in Canada. We already split between 
the federal and provincial governments, so I think 
there’s a way that we could share the idea of 
sovereignty [with Indigenous peoples]. In fact, 
there is a case on this. Someone challenged the 
Nisga’a treaty, and the reason they challenged it 
was because the Nisga’a had, in the Nisga’a 
treaty settlement… they were allocated powers 
that are federal and provincial. They act as a 
federal actor and a provincial actor within their 
territories. Someone challenged them. The case is 
Sga’nism Sim’augit (Chief Mountain) v. 
Canada.15 And the court said, the BC Court of 
Appeal said no, the distribution of power under  
ss 91 and 92 is not absolute.  
So there’s no reason that we couldn’t distribute 
jurisdiction more fairly to the Indigenous 
Peoples. And there’s a way that we can come to 
respect Indigenous laws and territory. And it has 
nothing to do with s 35. In fact, s 35, the sui 
generis approach, has taken us takes us 
completely the wrong way. 
                                                                                                                       
15 House of Sga’nism v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] B.C.J. No. 179, 2013 BCCA 49, 
[2013] 2 C.N.L.R. 226 (B.C.C.A.). 
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Everyone forgets now, but in 1980 there was a 
case called Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Minister of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development.16 It 
involved Indian people asserting Aboriginal title 
over the land. So, it was pre-Charter, pre-section 
35. It made its way up to the Federal Court of 
Appeal, and Judge Judson, I think, settles the 
case on the basis of common law customary law. 
He asks five questions. He says, “Do you have 
laws relating to land?” And we might also add 
related to government, if you’re asking that 
question. “Have you had these laws since time 
immemorial?” Check. “Are they cognizable to the 
common law? Can the common law look at those 
laws and understand them?” Yes, check. “Are they 
repugnant to the common law, do they create some 
set of laws or values that the common law just 
can’t stand?” No. “Have those laws been 
extinguished explicitly?” No. You have title. 
We can ask ourselves the same questions about 
Indigenous rights to govern their territories. The 
“jiggery pokery” of the suis generis approach has 
allowed the court to essentialize Indigenous 
people and then use those characterizations 
against Aboriginal rights and title. And there’s no 
need to do it. A common law tradition has room 
for Indigenous title and Indigenous governmental 
rights. And it’s about time that we deterred to the 
traditions of the common law to seek justice for 
Indigenous people in Canada. Thank you. 
…. 
Jonathan Rudin: Thanks. As Lorne said, we [at Aboroginal Legal 
Services Toronto] spend a fair amount of time in 
court ... And again, our focus is not exclusively but 
deals a lot with criminal issues because Indigenous  
 
                                                                                                                       
16 Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 
[1979] F.C.J. No. 184, [1980] 1 F.C. 518, [1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 17 (TD) (F.C.C.). 
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people are massively over-represented. Because 
there’s systemic and direct discrimination towards 
Aboriginal people, so we spend a lot of time in 
court. Can we achieve reconciliation through 
courts? So here’s the pessimistic part. We haven’t. 
Not only we haven’t, but the court has explicitly 
rejected that option when they had it.  
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada had the 
case of R. v. Kokopenace,17 which was a Charter 
case, it was a fair trial and right to jury case 
brought by Mr Kokopenace who had been 
convicted of second degree murder in Kenora. I 
won’t go through all the details. The Ontario 
government… basically, there were no First 
Nations people who lived on reserve who were 
really on the jury rolls in the Kenora district 
because the Ontario government couldn’t give a 
crap to do the work to get people on. That, 
admittedly, is my opinion. Also, the opinion that 
belongs to Aboriginal Legal Services and the 
opinion that we’ve developed after being 
involved in this issue by the time it got to the 
Court, for 10 years. 
The majority decision in Kokopenace, [written 
by] Justice Moldaver… one of the reasons… 
there were many reasons to reject this argument. 
But one argument that Ontario brought was: “the 
reason why Aboriginal people aren’t on juries is 
because they don’t want to be on juries. And 
there’s a lot of reasons for them, it’s very 
complicated.” And they pointed to a Justice 
Iacobucci’s report on First Nations’ representation 
on juries in Ontario, which was commissioned as 
a result of Ontario ignoring Indigenous people in 
the first place. 
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And Ontario’s argument is “Well, we can’t really 
fix this ourselves because it’s very complicated 
and Indigenous people have lots of reasons they 
don’t want to be on juries.” And Justice Moldaver 
says, “Yeah, it’s really hard. Reconciliation needs 
to happen.” He compliments Ontario for the steps 
that they were taking, because they are taking 
steps, and he says “But that’s not for us. That’s 
not for the court to do, that’s someone else. So 
let’s move on and we’ll let this happen 
somewhere else.” And the Minority decision—
there was [also] a concurring judgment by Justice 
Karakatsanis—but in the Minority decision, 
written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
Cromwell, Justice Cromwell said: “Well, the 
reason Aboriginal people aren’t participating in 
juries is because they don’t have any faith in the 
system, and the reason they don’t have any faith 
in the system is because of what the state did, so 
it hardly lies with the state to say we can’t fix a 
problem, 'cause we created something and it’s so 
intractable that we can’t fix it. That doesn’t seem 
right at all.” But that was the minority.  
So, that’s a very depressing decision and I will, 
without making too much comment, just contrast 
that with Justice Moldaver not being concerned at 
all in Jordan with revamping the whole system18 
… although there are very complex reasons for 
that [the need to revamp the right to trial within a 
reasonable time jurisprudence], but that’s okay to 
sort of impose a bunch of arbitrary guidelines [in 
the Jordan context]. Anyway.  
But nevertheless, because we are gluttons for 
punishment, and my colleague Emily Hill is here, 
we are both gluttons for punishment as are all of us 
at Aboriginal Legal Services. We continue with this 
task of trying to challenge the way that laws work. 
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But the way we’re trying to do it, we’re trying to do 
it differently and we’ll see if this works. We have 
been a part of a number of section 15 challenges to 
criminal law. Because if you start with the finding 
by the Supreme Court that Aboriginal people face 
direct and systemic discrimination in the criminal 
justice system, that’s a finding of the court. And we 
look at the section 15 jurisprudence, the state is not 
supposed to make inequality worse, and we have 
many examples, and Joe Arvay [the Keynote 
speaker at Osgoode Constitutional Cases 
Conference] talked about a number, we have many 
examples of how the state has made this worse. 
This should be a s 15 issue. This is an issue of 
equality. This isn’t an issue of arbitrariness, 
overbreadth, or gross disproportionality. Let’s get 
away from s 7, let’s call it what it is. 
What it is, is a perpetuation of inequality. So we 
have done this twice, we’ve lost once, we won 
once at the OCJ level, we will eventually get this 
matter heard at the Superior Court because there 
are no Jordan rules on appeals. These things can 
take forever. And we’re starting another one in 
Brampton. 
But this is what we’re starting to do and in the 
whatever number of years it’s going to take, 
because I do agree with Joe [Arvay] as well, the 
federal government is not hurriedly repealing the 
mandatory minimums, so there’s lots of room for 
us to continue litigation, sadly — we’ll have a 
better sense if we’re able to be successful. And I 
just want to say, if we’re not successful, it could 
be that we don’t make a good argument, it’s not 
necessarily that if you don’t like us you’re a 
racist. It’s possible there’s better arguments but 
I’ll be interested in whether the courts are willing 
to grapple with those issues because they often 
are not, and so we’re trying to put it front and 
centre and see what happens. 
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Lorne Sossin: Excellent. Amar, to close off our second round. 
Amar Bhatia: So, I just wanted to pick up on some of the things 
that folks have talked about in relation to 
sovereignty and, also, as I was mentioning before 
in terms of, for instance, the “permanent 
population” part of the sovereignty definition… 
which may be inappropriate… but I’m going to 
run with it and see how that works compared to 
reconciliation. 
If you need a permanent population to have 
sovereignty, you could also have a society 
reproduce itself. How does this happen? 
Historically this was happening through treaties 
for the settlement of foreign populations, also 
even for the infringement of title… that phrase 
‘settlement of foreign populations’ is still there.  
And then what does that mean in terms of having 
reconciliation? The idea that we’re all here to 
stay that can work both for reconciliation and that 
could work for migrant rights, that can also work 
for continuing the settler colonialism that I 
mentioned before. It doesn’t actually disrupt that 
structure.  
If you want to maybe talk about it in a way that 
would work towards reconciliation that does 
challenge that structure, the TRC has talked  
about that as part of their calls to action and  
that people should be educated about the treaties, 
and specifically in the context of citizenship, 
immigration, settlement, multiculturalism, 
“newcomers”, there’s the idea that you should 
educate folks about the treaties there. I think the 
government is actually going to follow through 
with this one, which is to put recognition and 
acknowledgement of the treaties in the 
Citizenship Oath. 
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So, partly, this is again bringing that idea of this 
awareness of the treaties in order to move people 
towards reconciliation. But what that doesn’t 
really get to is the idea about who gets to be a 
citizen in the first place and on what basis. If 
historically the treaties were used in order to 
settle the lands, and these are treaties that are 
between parties that are formed by both colonial 
law and Indigenous law, then presumably these 
[are]... I like to think of them as the first 
immigration laws. And I think that also means 
that Indigenous nations still have authority over 
immigration matters. 
So if you’re simply restricting reconciliation to 
folks who are already citizens, I don’t think that 
really gets to the question of how societies can 
reproduce themselves. One example in this 
context is if a First Nation tries to adopt a failed 
refugee claimant through a band council 
resolution, do you think that would keep that 
person in the country? Anyone? … 
So, show of hands if you think that will keep 
someone in the country. Yeah. Aspirationally? 
One person… one and half hands. It doesn’t keep 
someone in the country, partly because if you’re 
adopted under a Band Council Resolution, then 
that doesn’t actually give you Indian Act status. 
And so this goes to court and the argument is 
made that if this is happening, that the adoption 
should read into the Immigration Act that this 
person has Indian status and should also be 
allowed to stay in the country… just like others 
who are allowed to enter and remain… those who 
have citizenship in Canada. 
The court kind of laughs this off, they don’t really 
advance a full-blown articulation of the treaty 
right about why that’s important. But partly it is  
 
(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) TRANSCRIPT OF THE ROUNDTABLE 303 
because of the floodgates fear. As you can 
imagine, anyone in immigration and refugee law, 
this is like the big fear: the opening of the 
floodgates, which is a bit hilarious again in the 
settler colonial history of Canada that they’re 
worried about that. Anyway, without any irony, 
they say, “how can we have almost 600 First 
Nations being in charge of these decisions about 
immigration and citizenship and things like that, 
it just doesn’t make any sense.”   
Another fear was that if somebody like a failed 
refugee claimant is adopted into a band, that 
they’re in some kind of indentured status to that 
band that can revoke their membership and then 
they’ll be out of luck in terms of their security of 
staying in the country.  
So, on the floodgates fear: if you just compare 
how many people Canada gives labor market 
opinions to and the immigration context for work 
permits ... It’s much more than 600. If you look at 
the fear about an indentured status: again if 
you’re comparing to the temporary worker 
program that we run —where agricultural 
workers can never get permanent status, where 
caregivers have even lost some of the guarantees 
they had before about apply[ing] for permanent 
resident status—it doesn’t really make a lot of 
sense to me in terms of the fears about why this 
would happen [or of why] they say this should 
not be possible. 
I think that’s kind of a different and longer 
question, but partly it goes to essentializing 
people and who actually has control over the 
determination of their membership and their 
Nation, and why it is that only Canada gets to 
decide this for everybody. I think, if you measure 
reconciliation by that, it’s still going to fall short. 
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Douglas Sanderson: Listening to Amar talk I was reminded of 
something that happened to me last fall. Or 
maybe it was in the summer with all the Syrian 
refugees who were coming to Canada. And  
I thought, “what do you have to do to adopt a 
Syrian refugee?” 
There’s the government of Canada website, and 
so I went on the website and you have to answer 
this questionnaire and the very first question is 
“Are you a status Indian?” And I was blown 
away! I thought “I can’t do this anymore!” Just 
filed it away and completely forgot about it until 
this very minute. So they really do not want 
status Indians adopting… it’s like, that will get 
you out of the game right away. 
Lorne Sossin: That is more an invitation for more discussion 
than a comment that should close our discussion, 
but we are sadly at that time. I’ll invite those —  
I hope there are many in this category—who have 
some more questions to stay around for a few 
minutes after the formal end of the panel. Before 
I wrap up …. I just want to share a reflection that 
Murray Sinclair offered when he was standing 
here a week or so ago, giving a really wonderful 
lecture sponsored by the History Department here 
at York University. … 
[I]t goes to, I think, a theme, that’s been woven 
throughout each of these comments. Murray 
Sinclair made the point that reconciliation isn’t 
itself decolonizing. By saying the word it makes 
you feel good; but that good feeling is not one 
that you should trust. Reconciliation, if it is going 
to be meaningful at all, should be hard for 
Indigenous communities, because it invokes pain 
both individually and shared and that continues, 
and [moreover], for non-Indigenous people, it 
also should be hard, because there is a lot of work 
to do to decolonize. 
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Murray Sinclair’s point was that invoking 
reconciliation does not change any of the colonizing 
tendencies that seem so embedded in the whole 
existential structure of Canada’s history. I think that 
was something that resonated again for me here — 
and I will of course, reflect on much of what  
I learned and I hope you do as well. 
END 
 
 
